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summarized the sample of situations thus obtained as follows: Although 
it may "not be perfectly representative of 'life', there is no doubt that it 
is more representative and variegated with regard to size, distance, pro-
portion, color, surrounding patterns of objects, and other characteristics 
than any laboratory design could hope to be" (Brunswik, 1944; cited in 
Harnmond & Stewart, 2001, p. 70). 
lt seems fair to conclude that the study in the vision laboratory was not 
representative of "life" -indeed, this dimension was probably not even con-
sidered. Rather, the experimenter created highly constrained situations in 
which he had full control over variables, such as the size of the objects, their 
distance, and their colors. He also determined whether the participant's 
vision was binocular or monocular. (The participant was the first author, 
who was required to participate in a number of psychological studies as an 
undergraduate.) Whereas Brunswik aimed to sample situations that were 
representative of the actual demands of the environment in which the indi-
vidual lives, the Constance study investigated situations that rarely occur 
outside the artificial world of the vision lab. For Brunswik, the key concern 
was being able to generalize the results to the person's natural habitat. 
Accordingly, he sampled situations directly from the person's habitat. In 
contrast, for many experimentalists - today as well as in Brunswik' s time -
the prime objective is to carefully disentangle possible variables that affect 
a person's perceptual and cognitive performance. Consequently, experi-
mentalists create microworlds that may never occur in reality, but over 
which they exert full control. 
The topic of this chapter is what we believe to be the constructive ten-
sion between these two paradigms in psychological experimentation. We 
begin with a short historical review of the notion of representative desig11, 
Brunswik' s term for an experimental design that aims for a veridical repre-
sentation of the environment in which organisms naturally perform. Then 
we ask whether representative design matters for the results obtained. 
Lastly, we identify a key conceptual difficulty of representative design, 
namely, the issue of how to define the reference dass from w hich situa tions 
are sampled. We demonstrate how different reference classes may lead to 
different conclusions and discuss possible solutions for this problem. 
BRUNSWIK's CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOLOGISTS' WAY 
OF CONDUCTING BUSINESS 
The methodological dictate that has ruled experimental practices since 
the birth of experimental psychology is systematic design. According to 
its rationale, experimenters select and isolate one or a few independent 
variables that are varied systematically, while holding all other variables 
constant or allowing them to vary randomly. Experimenters then observe 
the resulting changes in the dependent variable(s), thus hoping to identify 
- ---------------·--- . _ __,_..._ _ _ 
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cause-effect relationships. Systematic design bets on internal validity, that is, on the sound demonstration that a causal relationship exists between two or more variables, rather than on external validity, which refers to the generalizability of the causal relationship beyond the experimental context. After all, so the logic goes, if internal validity is not guaranteed, no conclu-sions can be drawn with confidence about the effects of the independent variable. This logic was espoused by the founding fathers of experimen-tal psychology, for instance, by Hermann Ebbinghaus, and has frequently been propagated in textbooks on experimental psychology. Take, for ex-ample, Woodworth's (1938) classic textbook Experilnental Psychology, also known as the Colurnbia Bible, which promoted systematic design as the experimental tool (see Gillis & Schneider, 1966, for the historical roots of systematic design). 
Brunswik opposed psychology's default experimental method (Kurz & Tweney, 1997). He questioned both the feasibility of disentangling variables and the realism of the stimuli created in doing so. In what he considered to be the simplest variant of systematic design, the one-variable design, Brunswik (1944, 1955, 1956) pointed to the fact tl1at variables were "tied," thus making it impossible to determine the exact cause of an observed ef-fect. To illustrate this, he referred to classic experiments in psychophysics. U sing the Galton bar, experimenters presented lines of different lengths and requested observers to estimate their size. The distance between the exper-imental and the observed stimuli is held constant. Consequently, physical and retinal size are artificially "tied" because a small object will project a smaller retinal size and a large object will project a !arger retinal size. Of course, such ties can be disentangled by using a more sophisticated variant of systematic design, namely, factorial design. Here, the levels of one variable (e.g., physical size) are combined with the levels of another variable (retinal size), exhausting all possible combinations. Brunswik crit-icized factorial design on the grounds that even if two or more variables are untied, each variable still remains tied to many other factors that may affect the organism's achievement. In his view, complete systematic isola-tion of one variable as the crucial factor would involve the combination of this variable with a "very large, and in fact indefinite, number of orig-i nally tied situational variables" (Brunswik, 1955, p. 197). He also argued that factorial design, because it aims to control for all variables that are not being investigated, destroys the natural covariation among variables. Therefore, factorial design inhibits the researcher's ability to examine the Jevel of achievement that an organism reaches within its habitat. 
probabilistic Functionalism and Representative Design 
Brunswik's methodological convictions were closely intertwined with his theoretical outlook (Harnmond & Stewart, 2001; in particular, Kurz & 
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Hertwig, 2001).To fully appreciate Brunswik' s criticism, it is helpful to view 
it in combination with the theoretical framework that he advocated. In his 
theory of probabilistic functionalism, Brunswik (1943, 1952) argued that the 
real world is an important consideration in experimental research because 
psychological processes are adapted in a Darwinian sense to the environ-
ments in which they evolve and function (Harnmond, 1996). To the extent 
that psychology's objective is to study the adjustment of organisms to the 
environment in which they actually live, any test that is implemented to 
study adjustment should, according to Brunswik (1944), ensure "that the 
habitat of the individual, group, or species is represented with all of its vari-
ables, and that the specific values of these variables are kept in accordance 
with the frequencies in which they actually happen tobe distributed" (cited 
in Harnmond & Stewart, 2001, p. 69). 
The ecology that an organism adapts to is not perfectly predictable for 
the organism (Brunswik, 1943). A particular distal stimulus, for instance, 
does not always imply the same specific proximal effects. Sometimes a 
specific proximal effect does not occur despite the presence of the distal 
stimulus. Similarly, particular proximal effects do not always imply a spe-
cific distal stimulus because sometimes the same effect may be caused by 
other distal stimuli. Proximal cues are therefore only probabilistic indica-
tors of a distal variable. Brunswik (1940, 1952) proposed measuring the 
ecological (or predictive) validity of a cue by the correlation between the 
cue and the distal variable. The proximal cues are themselves interrelated, 
thus introducing redundancy (or intra-ecological correlations) into the en-
vironment. This redundancy, in turn, is the basis for vicarious functioning -
a principle that Brunswik (1952) considered as being the foundation on 
which the adaptive system is built. Since a cue is not always present, an 
adaptive system has to rely on multiple cues that can be substituted for 
each other. Systematic design, with its policy of isolating and controlling 
variables, risks destroying the causal texture of the environment to which 
an organism has adapted (Brunswik, 1944), and thus, ultimately, the pro-
cess of various functioning. To keep the process intact, Brunswik (1956) 
thought it necessary to sample experimental situations that are represen-
t~tive of a defined population of stimuli in terms of their number, values, 
dzstributions, intercorrelations, and ecological validities of their variable com-
ponents. Otherwise, the obtained results are no langer representative of 
the organism's actual functioning in its habitat. 
. Brunswik (1955) suggested three ways of achieving a representative de-
s~gn. The first and preferred way is by random sampling (also referred to as 
situational, representative, and natural sampling) of stimuli from a defined 
population of stimuli (reference dass) to which the experimenter wishes to 
generalize the findings. This is one form of what we today call probability 
sampling, where each stimulus has an equal probability of being selected. 
Note that time sampling is not synonymous with random sampling 
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because intervals may be sampled systematically (for a review of this sam-
pling method, see Czikszentmilhalyi & Larson, 1992). Brunswik's study 
that we described at the beginning used time sampling; for another appli-
cation of this method see Hogarth's (2005) chapter in the present book. The 
second way of achieving a representative design is through what Brunswik 
(1955, 1956) called the canvassing of stimuli and what today is known as 
nonprobability sampling, namely, stratified, quota, proportionate, or acci-
dental sampling (Baker, 1988). However, these procedures only provide a 
"primitive type of _coverage of the ecology" (Brunswik, 1955, p. 204). Per-
haps the most desirable, yet least feasible, way of achieving a representative 
design aims for a complete coverage of the entire population of stimuli. 
The fundamental shift in the method of psychology that Brunswik (1943) 
has called for did not occur. His contemporaries were united in their wish 
to maintain the status quo (Postman, 1955). Despite the fact that his ideas 
were published in leading journals, they were largely ignored, misunder-
stood, and treated with skepticism and hostility (Feigl, 1955; Hilgard, 1955; 
Hull, 1943; Krech, 1955; Postman, 1955). His colleagues' hostile response 
to the notion of representative design is not without irony when one 
considers that sampling (albeit the sampling of subjects, not of objects) 
has been considered a sine qua non of psychological experimentation. In 
fact, Brunswik (1943, 1944) called attention to the "double-standard" in 
the practice of sampling in psychological research, pointing out that the 
entire problem of generalization was thrown "onto the responder rather 
than onto the situation" (Brunswik, 1955, p. 195). To quote Harnmond 
(1998): 
Why, he wanted to know, is the logic we demand for generalization over the sub-
ject side ignored when we consider the input or environment side? Why is
 it that 
psychologists scrutinize subject sampling procedures carefully but cheerful
ly gen-
eralize their results - wi thou t any logical defense - to conditions outside thos
e used 
in the laboratory. (p. 2) 
lt seems that many decades later, the same double-standard lives on, 
and the issue of generalization still defies solution by the conventional 
methods of experimental design. In their incisive critique of current social 
psychological experimentation, Wells & Windschitl (1999) point to the ne-
glect of stimulus sampling as a "serious problem that plagues a surprising 
number of experiments" (p. 1115). Stimulus sampling, so they argued, is 
imperative whenever individual instances within categories (e.g., gender 
or race) vary from one another in ways that affect the dependent vari-
able. For example, relying on only one or two male confederates to test 
the hypothesis that men are more courteous to women than to men "can 
confound the unique characteristics of the selected stimulus with the cat-
egory," and "what might be portrayed as a category effect could in fact 
be due to the unique characteristics of the stimulus selected to represent 
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that category" (p. 1116). Indeed, in his own studies on social perception, 
Brunswik advocated the importance of presenting respondents with a rep-
resentative sample of "person-objects" (a phrase referring to the person 
tobe judged) (Brunswik, 1945, 1956; Brunswik & Reiter, 1937; for work in 
social perception in the tradition of Brunswik, see Funder, 1995). 
In conclusion, Brunswik stressed two major shortcomings of the sys-
tematic design that he hoped to remedy with the representative design: 
First, systematic design does not allow researchers to elicit and study thc 
process of vicarious functioning- the defining mark of an adaptive sys tem. 
Second, as a consequece, experimenters who rely on systematic design can-
not generalize their findings to the organisms' natural ecology. Next, we 
discuss the extent to which sampling experimental objects is as crucial for 
the results obtained as Brunswik believed. 
DOES SAMPLING OF EXPERIMENTAL STIMULI MATTER? 
Although Brunswik (1956) spelled out the theoretical rationale for repre-
sentative design, he could not point to evidence indicating that the way 
stimuli are sampled affects the results obtained. In the hope that som.e 
fifty years later such evidence would be available, Mandeep Dhami and 
ourselves compared the effects of systematic and representative designs 
in various lines of investigation, namely, policy-capturing research and rc-
search on overconfidence and on the hindsight bias (Dhami, Hertwig, & 
Hoffrage, 2004). In the following, we briefly summarize our main findings. 
Do Judgment Policies Differ in Representative 
versus Systematic Designs? 
The key goal of many studies in the tradition of policy-capturing research 
has been to pin down how people process (e.g., combine or weight) cues 
to judge real-world problems - for instance, the degree to which paticnts 
have a mental health problem, the amount of bail tobe set on a number 
of cases, the quality of shopping centers, or whether it was safe for a car 
to cross an intersection. To this end, participants are typically required to 
make decisions on a set of either real or hypothetical cases each with a 
corresponding set of cues. A person's judgment policy is then inferred, 
traditionally, using a multiple linear regression analysis and is character-
ized, for instance, in terms of the number and weight of cues used to make 
judgments. In addition, achievement is frequently measured in terms of 
the correlation between a person's judgments and the criterion values and 
by comparing the person's policy with a model of the task (for overvievvs, 
see Cooksey, 1996; Stewart, 1988). 
Many researchers who aim at capturing policies have adopted thc 
Brunswikian approach to study judgment and decision making. They have 
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expressed a commitment to the method of representative design, which, 
they argue, differentiates them from other researchers in cognitive psychol-
ogy, in general, and judgment and decision making, in particular (e.g., see 
Brehmer, 1979; Cooksey, 1996; Hastie & Harnmond, 1991, p. 498). In light 
of their explicit commitment to the method of representative design, we 
were surprised to find that a !arge proportion of studies (those thatrelied on 
formal situational sampling; see Harnmond, 1966) often failed to represent 
the ecological properties toward which generalizations were intended. For 
instance, researchers rarely combined cues to preserve their intercorrela-
tions - an essential condition for the operation of vicarious functioning. 
Possibly, the most rigorous test of the effect of representative design is 
a within-subjects comparison of policies captured for individuals under 
both a representative and an unrepresentative condition. Not surprisingly, 
given the frequent failure to implement representative design, we found 
only two published studies that aimed for such a test. The first study ex-
amined how livestock experts judge the breeding quality of pigs. In an 
unrepresentative condition, Phelps & Shanteau (1978) asked experts to re-
spond to descriptions of hypothetical cases comprising a fractional factorial 
combination of eleven cues indicative of the breeding quality of pigs. Two 
months later, now partaking in a representative condition, the same experts 
rated the overall quality of eight pigs in photographs and provided r~~ings 
on the eleven cues. The experts' inferred policy differed across cond1h~ns: 
In the unrepresentative condition, experts used markedly more cues (1.e., 
nine to eleven) than in the representative condition (i.e., fewer than three) 
as suggested by the number of statistically significant cues in the captured 
policies. In the second rigorous test of the impact of sampling procedur~ on 
the captured policy, Moore & Holbrook (1990) studied the car-purchasmg 
policies of MBA students and found a significant difference bet"".een the 
weights attached to two cues in individuals' policies captured usmg rep-
resentative and unrepresentative stimuli. . 
In addition, Dhami et al. (2004) found a small set of other stud1es t~at 
compared policies captured under representative and u~represent~hve 
conditions, albeit less stringently. Overall, the findings in th1s set are mixed 
(for details, see Dhami et al., 2004, Table 5). Whereas some researchers 
found differences in the policies captured using representative and un-
representative cases (Ebbesen & Konecni, 1975, 1980; Ebbesen, Parker, & 
Konecni, 1977; Harnmond & Stewart 1974), others concluded that there 
are no differences (Braspenning & Sergeant, 1994; Olson, Dell'omo, & 
Jarley, 1992; Oppewal & Timmermans, 1999). When differences were ob-
served, they occurred on multiple dimensions including ~~ose that ~helps 
& Shanteau (1978) and Moore & Holbrook (1990) identified, that 1s, the 
number and weight of cues. 
Because of the- small number of studies, it is difficult to draw any 
definite conclusions regarding the effects of representative design in 
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policy-capturing studies. Fortunately, however, in Dhami et al. (2004), we 
could turn to two other lines of research that have investigated the impact 
of sampling experimental stimuli, namely, research on the overconfidence 
effect and the hindsight bias. What caused researchers' interest in this issue? 
How Rational Do People Appear in Representative and Systematic 
Designs? The Case of Overconfidence and Hindsight Bias 
In Brunswik's understanding of psychology as a functionally oriented 
science, one should study the adjustment of organisms to the environ-
ments in which they actually live and the resulting level of the organ-
isms' achievements. Although many contemporary psychologists would 
not necessarily share Brunswik's commitment to a functional perspective, 
akin to his program, they aim to describe and explain people's cognitive 
and behavioral achievements. However, the empirical results are typically 
not couched in terms of adjustment and achievement, but, for instance, 
in terms of people's rationality or lack thereof. For an illustration, take the 
heuristics-and-biases program (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1996), which is, on many accounts, the most influ-
ential research program within cognitive and social psychology over the 
past thirty years. 
Since its inception in the early 1970s, the heuristics-and-biases program. 
has produced a large and growing collection of findings dernonstrating 
that human reasoning frequently departs from classic norms of rationality. 
These findings include insensitivity to sample size, base-rate neglect, rnis-
perceptions of chance, illusory correlations, overconfidence, and hindsight 
bias. Such "cognitive illusions" have been explained in terms of simple 
heuristics that people, being cognitively limited, need to rely on when they 
make inferences about an uncertain world (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Resting their judgment on the seemingly ubiquitous cognitive illusions, 
many researchers have arrived at a bleak assessment of human reasoning-
as nothing more than "ludicrous," "indefensible," and "self-defeating" (see 
Krueger & Funder, 2004). 
Like Brunswik, the heuristics-and-biases program has stressed that peo-
ple need to function in an inherently uncertain world. In Brunswik' s words, 
the "environment to which the organism must ad just presents itself as semi-
erratic and that therefore all functional psychology is inherently probabilis-
tic" (Brunswik, 1955, p. 193). If so, and this forms the core of representative 
design, then the statistical properties of the laboratory task need to rep-
resent the statistical properties of the ecology to which the results are to 
be generalized. Concerns about whether this has been true in studies of 
cognitive illusions have given rise to a Brunswikian perspective, first in 
research on the overconfidence effect and then in research on the hindsight 
bias. 
-----
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The overconfidence effect plays a prominent role among the cognitive 
illusions catalogued by the heuristics-and-biases program (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1996). lt has received considerable attention both within psy-
chology (for a recent review, see Hoffrage, 2004) and beyond [e.g., in 
economics-see Hertwig & Ortmann (2004); andin consumer decision mak-
ing - see Alba & Hutchinson (2000)]. Studies in psychology that demon-
strate the overconfidence effect typically present respondents with ques-
tions that test their general knowledge, such as "Which city has more 
inhabitants: Atlanta or Baltimore?" Participants are asked to select the cor-
rect option and then indicate their confidence that it is indeed correct. The 
frequently replicated finding is that among choices about which people 
say they are 100% confident, only about 80% are correct. Similarly, among 
choices about which people deem themselves 90% confident, only about 
75% are correct, and so on. In quantitative terms, the overconfidence effect 
is usually defined as the difference between the mean confidence rating 
and the mean percentage correct across a series of such general knowledge 
questions. 
Are people really as out of touch with the accuracy of their knowledge 
as the host of overconfidence studies suggests? Adopting a Brunswikian 
perspective, and thus paying special attention to how overconfidence re-
searchers sampled general knowledge questions, Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & 
Kleinbölting (1991) challenged this conclusion. According to their theory of 
probabilistic mental models, people respond to questions, such as which city 
has more residents, by constructing a mental model that contains prob-
abilistic cues and their validities. For instance, when choosing between 
Atlanta and Baltimore, a person may retrieve the fact that Atlanta has one 
of the world's fifty busiest airports and that Baltimore does not, and that 
cities with such an airport tend tobe larger than those without. Capitaliz-
ing on the knowledge of this cue, the person thus concludes that Atlanta 
has more inhabitants than Baltimore, and then states the cue's validity as 
her subjective confidence that this choice is correct. 
At this point, the way in which experimenters sample questions be-
comes crucial. To illustrate this, let us assume that only one cue, the airport 
cue, can be retrieved, upon which basis the relative population size of U.S. 
cities is inferred. Among the fifty largest U.S. cities, the airport cue has 
an ecological validity of .6 (Soll, 1996). The ecological validity of a cue is 
defined as the percentage of correct choices rendered possible by this cue. 
If the participants' assessment of the validity of the cue approximates its 
ecological validity, then they should be well calibrated, that is, they do 
not overestimate the accuracy of their knowledge. This means that given 
a confidence category (e.g., 60%), the relative frequency of correct choices 
should equal this value (here, 60%). This, however, only holds true under 
two conditions: The first is that people's subjective cue validities approxi-
mate the ecological validities - an assumption that is consistent with a rich 
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literature demonstrating that people seem tobe keenly sensitive to envi-
ronmental frequencies (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1984). The second condition 
is that the experimenter samples questions such that the cues' validities in 
the experimental sample of questions are preserved. 
Gigerenzer et al. (1991) suggested that overconfidence stems from the 
fact that the second condition typically is not preserved. Specifically, they 
argued that researchers do not sample general knowledge questions ran-
domly but tend to overrepresent items in which cue-based inferences 
would lead to wrong choices. If so, then overconfidence would not re-
flect fallible reasoning processes but would be an artifact of the way the 
experimenter sampled the stimuli and ultimately misrepresented the cue-
criterion relations in the ecology. Supporting this interpretation, Gigerenzer 
et al. (1991, Study 1) were able to show that people were well calibrated 
when questions included randomly sampled items from a defined ref-
erence dass (here, German cities). Percentage correct and mean confi-
dence amounted to 71.7% and 70.8%, respectively. They were also able 
to replicate the overconfidence effect in a nonrandomly selected set of 
items -here, percentage correct and mean confidence amounted to 52.9% 
and 66.7%, respectively; overconfidence was 13.8%. The same pattern of 
findings has been independently predicted and replicated by Peter Juslin 
and his colleagues (e.g., Juslin, 1993, 1994; Juslin & Olsson, 1997; Juslin, 
Olsson, & Björkman, 1997); for further effects tl1at are consistent with 
a Brunswikian perspective, such as the confidence-frequency effect, see 
Gigerenzer et al. (1991). 
One objection that has been raised against this Brunswikian interpre-
tation of overconfidence is that the observed differences between the se-
lected and representative set of questions are just another manifestation 
of the hard-easy effect (e.g., Griffin & Tversky, 1992). The hard-easy effect 
is the observation that overconfidence covaries with item difficulty: Dif-
ficult item sets (i.e., percentage of correct answers about 75% or lower) 
tend to produce overconfidence, whereas easy sets (i.e., percentage correct 
about 75% or higher) tend to produce underconfidence. At first glance, 
the hard-easy effect seems to be confounded with the sampling proce-
dure. Specifically, sets consisting of representatively drawn items tend to 
be easier and confidence judgments tend tobe well calibrated. In contrast, 
selected sets are difficult (as items often have been selected to be difficult, 
or even misleading) and tend to yield overconfidence. 
The differential impact of item difficulty and sampling procedure, how-
ever, can be teased apart empirically: In a meta-analysis, Juslin, Winman, & 
Olsson (2000) conducted a review of ninety-five independent data sets with 
selected items and thirty-five sets with representatively sampled items. 
Across all selected and representative item sets, overconfidence was 9% 
and 1 %, respectively (with 95% confidence intervals for each of the two 
sampling procedures of ±2%). Having statistically controlled for item 
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difficulty, the authors pointed out that this difference could not be 
explained by differences in percentage correct, as has been clairned by 
Griffin & Tversky (1992), based on three data points. Moreover, when they 
controlled for end effects of the confidence scale and linear dependence be-
tween percentage correct and the over-/underconfidence score (i.e., rnean 
confidence minus percentage correct), the hard-easy effect nearly disap-
peared for the representative item sets. 
The impact of the itern-sampling procedure is not restricted to the over-
confidence effect. lt also matters, for instance, for the hindsight bias - the 
tendency to falsely believe, after the fact, that one would have correctly 
predicted the outcorne of an event. [Fora recent collection of papers on the 
hindsight bias, see Hoffrage & Pohl (2003).] 
Akin to research on overconfidence, Winman (1997) presented partic-
ipants with general knowledge questions, such as "Which of these two 
countries has a higher mean life expectancy, Egypt or Bulgaria?" Before 
they responded to the question, participants were told the correct answer, 
Bulgaria, and then were asked to identify the option they would have cho-
sen had they not been told the correct answer. Winrnan (1997) presented 
participants with selected and representative sets of questions. In the latter, 
the countries involved were drawn randomly frorn a specified reference 
dass. The differences in hindsight bias were striking: In the selected set, 
42% of the items elicited the hindsight bias, whereas in the representative 
set only 29% did. Moreover, Winman observed that in the representative 
sample only three out of twenty participants reached a higher degree of 
accuracy in hindsight than in foresight (thus indicating the hindsight bias). 
In the selected sample, in contrast, fourteen out of twenty participants fell 
prey to the hindsight bias (in terms of higher hindsight accuracy); for rnore 
detailed analyses and additional data regarding the irnpact of sarnpling of 
items on the hindsight bias, see Winman and Juslin's (2005) chapter in the 
present volume. 
In conclusion, in Brunswik' s view, psychology is the study of the adjust-
ment of organisms to environments and the resulting degree of achieve-
ment. A prominent research program in contemporary psychology, the 
heuristics-and-biases program, also focuses on achievement, rneasured in 
terms of the degree to which the cognitive system is able to reason in accor-
dance with the laws of statistics and probability theory. For Brunswik, the 
experimental stimuli used to measure the organisms' degree of achieve-
ment need tobe selected so that the sample is representative of the actual 
demands that the environrnent makes upon the organism. Recent research 
on the overconfidence effect and the hindsight bias has dernonstrated that 
people's cognitive achievement, herein terms of the veridical assessment 
of their knowledge, depends strongly on how the experimental stimuli 
are sampled. Thus, experimenters' conclusions about how much or little 
people achieve in their uncertain inferences, and how rational or irrational 
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they are, appear to depend also on how experimenters select the stimuli 
that constitute the reality of the laboratory. 
REPRESENTATIVE DESIGN AND SIZE OF THE REFERENCE CLASS 
Sampling of experimental stimuli matters. Overconfidence, or the lack 
thereof, for instance, appears to be a function of whether experimental 
stimuli are randomly drawn from a specified reference dass. In the follow-
ing, we examine the boundary condition of this observation. Specifically, 
we examine whether the overconfidence phenomenon is robust across dif-
ferent sizes of the reference dass. According to the theory of probabilistic 
mental models (Gigerenzer et al., 1991), people are weil adapted to their 
natural environments, and they are able to estimate cue validities with a 
reasonable degree of accuracy. But what if cue validities change as a func-
tion of different sizes of the reference dass, and if so, which reference dass 
is the one to which people are adapted? 
Cue validities can depend on the size of the reference dass. To a pprecia te 
this, consider the hypothetical environment of objects in Figure 16.1. In this 
environment, there are six objects with their cue values on one dichotomous 
cue: Objects A and C have a cue value of "l," and Objects B, D, E, and F 
have a cue value of "O". Cue values are coded such that in a comparison 
between two objects with values of "l" and "O," the object with the value 
of "1" is more likely tobe !arger. The validity of the cue (as computed in the 
complete paired comparison) is 87.5% (i.e., seven out of eight inferences 
are correct). How would this validity be affected if we reduced the size of 
Objects: 
Cue values: 
A B C D E F 
~-..... U_) J 
Size = 3 
Validity = 50% 
Slze = 6 
Valldlty = 87,5% 
• Cue value of 1 
0 Cue value of 0 
\___.J Correct lnference 
'•, ••••• : Wrong Jnference 
FIGURE 16.1. Six fictitious objects, ordered according to a numerical criterion, 
with A being the largest and F the smallest. Black circles represent a cue value 
of "1" (e.g., a particular feature is present), and white circles represent a cue value 
of "O" (e.g., a particular feature is absent). The validity of this cue depends on the 
size of the reference dass, that is, on the number of objects !arger than a speci-
fied threshold. Two objects between which the cue does not discriminate (and thus 
does not allow for an inference) are not connected; such a pair does not enter the 
computation of cue validity. 
Which World Should Be Represented in Representative Design? 393 
TABLE 16.1. Validities of Twelve Cues in the Set of German Cities (Table Taken from 
Hoffrage, 1995) 
Threshold 
100,000 150,000 200,000 300,000 
Size of reference dass" 65 42 31 16 
Resulting number of pairs 2080 861 465 120 
Cues and their validities 
University 70 75 69 64 
Intercity station 77 75 76 0 
Airport 89 80 86 78 
Soccer team in national league 90 82 81 65 
Industrial belt 57 51 42 44 
Government 84 72 76 73 
License plate 92 90 84 65 
Zip code 80 93 83 85 
Symbol in road map 99 97 99. 100 
Court ( "Oberlandesgericht") 80 79 86 83 
Nationalpension offices 76 71 62 87 
Area (square kilometers) 82 87 85 89 
aThe size of the reference dass is the number of cities with more inhabitants than the threshold. 
the reference dass from which objects are sampled to a subset of the largest 
n objects? (Whenever we use the term size of the reference class, here and in 
the following, we refer to the number of objects with a criterion value that 
is higher than a specific threshold.) lt turns out that the validity depends 
on the threshold; specifically, for the reference classes of size 6, 5, 4, 3, and 
2, the validities are 7 /8, 5/6, 3/4, 1/2, and 1, respectively (see Figure 16.1). 
Thus, except for the reference dass of size 2, validity decreases as the size 
of the reference dass decreases. 
Figure 16.1 illustrates a hypothetical environment, but what about real-
world environments? Clearly, in many environments the issue of the size 
of the reference dass will not matter. For instance, the reference dass of 
all Nobel laureates, or nations that partook in the last Olympic Games, is 
well defined. Other reference dasses, however, have fuzzy borders. Take 
the dass of German cities. Though there is a strict bureaucratic definition 
of what counts as a city, people's subjective reference dasses may take 
on very different sizes. If so, how would different sizes impact on cue 
validity? Gigerenzer et al. (1991) used all German cities with more than 
100,000 inhabitants (as of 1988). Although 100,000 is a salient number, other 
thresholds might have been used. Indeed, as Table 16.1 shows, the cue 
validities in this environment depend on this threshold, that is, on the 
rninimum number of inhabitants a city must have tobe included in the set. 
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Across four different thresholds, cue validities varied widely: For one of 
the twelve cues, the validity dropped from 77% to 0%; for the others, the 
average absolute difference between the validities among all cities with 
more than 100,000 inhabitants and those among all cities with more than 
300,000 was 10.3% (when we designed and published the studies reported 
in Gigerenzer et al., 1991, we were not aware of this dependency). The 
average Pearson and Spearman correlations between the cue validities 
(first computed across the twelve cues within a given pair of thresholds, 
and then averaged across the six possible pairs of thresholds that can be 
constructed from the four thresholds displayed in Table 16.1) were .66 
and .62, respectively. 
The observation that cue validities depend on the specific size of the 
reference dass as determined by the experimenter can matter for the in-
terpretation of empirical results and for the selection of experimental ma-
terials. In the following, we illustrate these points in the contexts of over-
confidence research (Study 1) and of a computer simulation of different 
inference heuristics (Study 2). 
Study 1: Over-/Underconfidence Depends on the Size 
of the Reference Class 
The first study was designed both as a test of the recognition heuristics 
and to investigate the effect of different sizes of the reference dass on 
overconfidence. The recognition heuristic is an inference heuristic that can 
be applied to infer, for instance, which of two cities has more inhabitants. 
Its policy is as follows: "If one of two objects is recognized and the other is 
not, then infer that the recognized object has the higher value with respect 
to the criterion" (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 76). 
Austrian students (from the University of Salzburg, N = 60) were asked 
to decide for 100 pairs of U.S. cities which of two cities has more res-
idents (Hoffrage, 1995, Study 4). For ten participants, these pairs were 
created by combining cities that were randomly sampled from the set of 
all (n = 72) cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants (as of 1988, hence-
forth the Zarge set); for another ten participants, the cities were randomly 
sampled from the set of those (n = 32) cities with more than 400,000 in-
habitants (henceforth the small set). After making their decisions and judg-
ing their confidence, participants were asked to state the following for 
each city: 
(i) whether they had any knowledge about the city beyond mere name 
recognition (henceforth denoted by K, for knowledge); 
(ii) whether they recognized the city's name, but had no more knowl-
edge about it (R, for recognition); or 
(iii) whether they had never heard of the city (U, for unknown). 
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Cities > 200.000 inhabitants (N = 75): Validity = n.4% 
HIDIIIDIIIIIIHHHl'IUHHH:eoa::IHIHHIICXXIIIIIIII~ 
largest smallest 
city City 
Cities > 400.000 inhabitants (N = 32): Validity = 69.3% 
11111111::.o«lD\111~ 
largest smallest 
City City 
FIGURE 16.2. Austrian participants' recognition values of U.S. cities. Thirty partic-
ipants provided recognition judgments about the largest seventy-five cities (top) 
and another thirty participants about the largest thirty-two cities (bottom). Black 
circles represent cities that at least half of the participants recognized (regardless 
of whether they also had some knowledge beyond mere name recognition); white 
circles represent cities that less than half of the participants recognized. The validity 
of the recognition cue was first computed for each participant separately and then 
averaged across participants. 
Because the experimenter did not control which objects (of the large 
set and of the small set) were paired together, these two groups were 
tested in an approximation to a representative design. For the other partic-
ipants, the experimenter systematically manipulated how the cities were 
paired. These forty participants first stated their recognition knowledge for 
each city: twenty participants for all cities from the large set and another 
twenty for all citie~ from the small set. For half of each group of twenty, 
the comparisons were constructed such that the recognition heuristic of-
ten discriminated; for the other half they were constructed such that the 
heuristic rarely discriminated.1 
Figure 16.2 represents the knowledge of the average participant about 
the American cities. Specifically, the black circles represent cities that at 
least half of the participants recognized irrespective of whether they also 
had some knowledge beyond mere name recognition; the white circles 
represent the cities that less than half of the participants recognized. As 
one can see, the more inhabitants a city has, the higher the likelihood is 
that the name is recognized. The validity of the recognition knowledge 
is computed among all possible combinations of two cities where one is 
1 For each participant who was given the comparisons such that the recognition heuristic 
often discriminated, the types of comparisons (and their frequencies) were the following 
(types in which the recognition heuristic discriminated are in italics): K-U (25), R-U (30), K-
R (30), K-K (5), R-R (5), and U-U (5). For participants who were given the comparisons such 
that the recognition heuristic rarely discriminated, the composition of pairs was as follows: 
K-U (5), R-U (20), K-R (20), K-K (5), R-R (30), and U-U (20). Note that in addition to the 
cases in which the recognition heuristic discriminated (K-U and R-U ), knowledge about 
cue values could also lead to discrimination (potentially in K-R and K-K comparisons). 
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TABLE 16.2. Mean Confidence, Percentage of Correct Inferences, and 
Over-/Underconfidence as a Function of the Size of the Reference Class and 
the Discrimination Rate of the Recognition Cue 
Discrimination Rate of Mean Percent Over-/Under-
Recognition Cue Confidence Correct Confidence 
Large set (all cities > 200,000) 
Chance 70.7 72.3 -1.6 
High 67.4 69.4 -2.0 
Low 64.2 63.9 0.3 
Small set (all cities > 400,000) 
Chance 73.6 61.5 12.1 
High 74.9 65.5 9.4 
Low 68.1 58.2 9.9 
recognized and the other is not. The validity is the percentage of pairs in 
this set for which the recognized city has more inhabitants than the one that 
is not recognized (i.e., black-white combinations where the black cirde is 
to the left). This validity was computed for each individual participant. 
Averaged across all participants who received the large set, the validity 
was 77.4%. For the small set, in contrast, this value was only 69.3%. 
Did the participants' percentage of correct inferences show the same 
relationship? Yes. For each of the three discrimination conditions (cities 
randomly sampled irrespective of their recognition values, high discrimi-
nation rate, low discrimination rate), not only the validity of the recognition 
cue (Figure 16.2) but also the percentage of correct inferences (Table 16.2) 
was higher for the large set. 
What about confidence and, thus, overconfidence? Were participants 
aware that the validity of the recognition cue (and probably also of the 
other cues they used) depends on the size of the reference dass and did 
they adjust their confidences accordingly? In fact, mean confidences were 
different for the two sizes of the reference dass. However, the difference 
points in the opposite direction: For each discrimination rate, confidences 
were higher for the small set (Table 16.2). That is, as the proportion of 
recognized cities increased, the validity of the recognition cue and the 
percentage correct decreased, whereas mean confidence increased. Taking 
mean confidence and percentage correct together, we can see that over-
confidence disappeared for the large set, whereas there was substantial 
overconfidence for the small set (Table 16.2). Note that the effect of the 
size of the reference dass on overconfidence was most pronounced in the 
chance setwhere the discrimination rate of the recognition cue had not been 
manipulated. However, also note that the effect could still be observed in 
the two conditions where the discrimination rate had been controlled for, 
I ··-----------~----- --
j 
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suggesting that the effect in the chance condition was not due to only differ-
ent frequency distributions of comparison types (e.g., a higher percentage 
of cases in which both cities were recognized in the small set compared to 
the corresponding percentage for the large set). For another example of dif-
ferent degrees of over-/underconfidence attributed to different reference 
classes, see Juslin, Olsson, & Winman (1998). 
A closer look at the data (not shown in Table 16.2) revealed that once the 
type of comparison (K-U, K-R, etc.) was controlled, the participants in the 
same size of reference dass condition did not differ with respect to mean 
percentage correct, mean confidence, and overconfidence. In other words, 
the effect of the discrimination rate (which was either quasi-experimentally 
observed or experimentally manipulated) could be fully accounted for by 
the different frequency distributions of the types of comparisons. Thus, 
the results support the hypothesis that participants used the recognition 
heuristic: Manipulating how often recognition discriminates between two 
cities affects overall performance on the group level.2 
In summary, whether people appear overconfident in a study is a func-
tion of not only the sampling procedure (randomly versus selected) but 
also the size of the reference dass from which the experimental stimuli are 
randomly drawn. In the next study, we turn to a daunting problem any 
experimenter faces when aiming to determine which of several cognitive 
policies people use. In doing so, one often realizes that it is difficult to 
discriminate among different policies because they frequently predict the 
same behavior. To illustrate this problem, let us return to the recognition 
heuristic. 
Study 2: Policy Capturing and the Size of the Reference Class 
If a person has to decide which of two cities is larger, and if the only infor-
mation at hand is whether or not the person recognizes one of the cities, 
then that person can do little better than rely on partial ignorance, choosing 
recognized cities over unrecognized ones. Both the aforementioned study 
as well as Goldstein & Gigerenzer' s (2002) studies show that people appear 
to rely on this judgment policy- a policy that works well when recognition 
2 The data allow for an even stronger test. Remember that for each city the recognition value 
was elicited, either before or after the comparisons were performed. In the vast majority 
of cases, participants decided in favor of the city they knew more about. In particular, 
for comparisons of the types K-U, K-R, and R-U , the percentages of decisions that were 
made in favor of the city with a higher recognition value were 91.1 %, 79.3%, and 79.9%, 
respectively. Moreover, participants obtained a markedly better performance when they 
chose the city suggested by the recognition heuristic: The percentages of correct choices 
were 83.6%, 74.9%, and 65.3%, respectively. In contrast, if they decided in favor of the city 
they knew less about, the performance for each comparison type was even below chance 
level, namely, 21.2%, 48.5%, and 39.2%, respectively. 
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is correlated with the criterion that needs tobe inferred. To explain how an 
association between recognition and a criterion may develop, Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer (2002) proposed that there are "mediators" in the environment 
that reflect the criterion and, at the same time, are accessible to the decision 
maker. For example, an American citizen may have no direct informa-
tion about the population size of a German city, say, Mannheim. However, 
Mannheim's population size may be reflected in how often Mannheim is 
mentioned in U.S. daily newspapers. Frequency of mentions, in turn, is 
correlated with recognition: The more frequently the name of a city ap-
pears in the newspaper, the more likely it is that a reader will encounter 
its name. In this sense, the newspaper can serve as a mediator between 
recognition and the criterion (here, population size). In line with this view, 
Goldstein & Gigerenzer (2002) found that the ecological correlation - that 
is, the correlation between how often the names of German cities (with 
more than 100,000 residents) are mentioned in a major U.S. newspaper, the 
Chicago Tribune, and their actual populations - was .82. 
As with any heuristics, the recognition heuristic is a judgment policy of 
limited scope: lt cannot be applied when hoth cities are either recognized 
or not recognized. Another heuristic, the fluency heuristic, however, is ap-
plicable both when the recognition heuristic is applicable and when both 
cities are recognized and the recognition heuristic is thus not applicable. 
Like the recognition heuristic, it relies on only one reason: the fluency with 
which the objects are reprocessed. Fluency has been shown to function as a 
cue across a range of judgments (e.g., Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Jacoby 
et al., 1989). In the context of a two-alternative choice, such as the city-size 
task, Schooler & Hertwig (2005) defined the heuristic task as follows: If one 
of two objects is rnore fluently reprocessed, then infer that this recognized object 
has the higher value with respect to the criterion. 
To study the performance of both the recognition heuristic and the 
fluency heuristic, Schooler & Hertwig (2005) implemented them within 
a well-known cognitive architecture, namely, ACT-R (e.g., Anderson & 
Lebierre, 1998). Here, we will not be concerned with the details of this im-
plementation (for such details, see Schooler & Hertwig, 2005). The bottom 
line is that fluency is a function of a city's activation, and activation 
within ACT-R is a function of two factors: the objects' environmental 
frequencies, such as mentions in the newspaper, and recency of occur-
rence (e.g., when a city was mentioned in the newspaper).3 Using the 
3 Within ACT-R, the system cannot inspect activation levels directly; that is, it cannot simply 
read off the activation of a record. However, Schooler & Hertwig (2005) proposed that by 
taking advantage of the one-to-one mapping between activation and retrieval time, the 
speed of retrieval could be used as a proxy for activation. Rather than assuming that the 
system can discriminate between minute differences in any two retrieval times, however, 
they allowed for limits on the system's ability to do this. Specifically, if the retrieval times of 
the two alternatives were within a just noticeable difference of each other, then the system 
guessed. 
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FIGURE 16.3. Percentage of correct inferences made by the recognition heuristic and 
the fluency heuristic as a function of the size of the reference dass. Adapted from 
Schooler & Hertwig (2005). 
environmental frequencies (i.e., mentions in the Chicago Tribune) and the 
recognition rate that Goldstein & Gigerenzer (2002) observed for the largest 
eighty-three German cities in a sample of students from the University of 
Chicago, Schooler & Hertwig (2005) calculated the cities' activations. This 
was carried out to ensure that performance based on the recognition rate 
of the model and empirical recognition was in agreement. Having thus 
ensured this correspondence, they could now analyze the performance of 
the recognition heuristic and the fluency heuristic, respectively. 
Recall the policies of the two heuristics in question: For all possible pairs 
of cities within a reference dass, the recognition heuristic chose the recog-
nized city when only one of the cities in a given pair was recognized, and 
otherwise it guessed. In contrast, the fluency heuristic chose the city that 
was more fluently reprocessed as long as both cities were above the recogni-
tion threshold; otherwise it guessed. Figure 16.3 shows the performance of 
the two heuristics as a function of an increasing size of the reference dass -
the dimension that concerns us here. When the reference dass and thus the 
pair comparison only indude the ten largest German cities, then the flu-
ency heuristic dearly outperforms the recognition heuristic. Whereas the 
fluency heuristic scores 70.1 % correct inferences, the recognition heuristic 
scores 62%. This picture, however, changes as the reference dass becomes 
more encompassing. The performance edge drops to a 5% difference when 
the twenty largest cities are induded (69% versus 64.6% correct inferences), 
and it shrinks to a 1 % advantage when all eighty-three largest German cities 
are induded. 
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Why does the performance accuracy level of the heuristics converge 
with more encompassing reference size? The relative performance edge 
the fluency heuristic has over the recognition heuristic stems from the fre-
quency of pairs in which both objects are recognized. lt is only here that 
the two heuristics arrive at different judgments - when one object is rec-
ognized and the other is not, they behave identically, and when neither 
object is recognized, both heuristics need to guess. The likelihood, how-
ever, that both cities are recognized is particularly high for the very large 
cities (whose names appeared relatively frequently in the Chicago Tribu11e) 
and shrinks as the size of the reference dass increases. 
This finding highlights the possible performance dependence of the two 
heuristics on the reference dass upon which they are tested. Had their per-
formance been tested by relying only on the ten or twenty largest cities, then 
the fluency heuristic would have been judged tobe markedly more accu-
rate than the recognition heuristic. Indeed it is - but merely in the small set 
of large to very large German cities. Across a less restricted set of German 
cities (e.g., all cities with more than 100,000 residents), the strategies' per-
formances are almost indistinguishable and there is no dear winner. This 
outcome thus demonstrates that the performance of heuristics, as well as 
ultimately the experimenter's condusion, also depends on the size of the 
reference dass. 
Trying to distinguish between heuristics can be a daunting endeavor. 
To appreciate this, consider two experimenters who try to discover which 
of the two heuristics - the recognition heuristic or the fluency heuristic -
people tend to use. To do so, the first experimenter uses all eighty-three 
German cities (with more than 100,000 residents), thus composing 3,403 
pair comparisons. In this case, to find out whether a person' s judgment pol-
icy is akin to the recognition heuristic or the fluency heuristic, respectively, 
will be extremely difficult, because in the majority of the 3,403 compar-
isons, both heuristics will arrive at the same predictions. The proportion 
of discriminatory cases will be minuscule, and the performance level of 
users of the recognition heuristic and users of the fluency heuristic will be 
hardly distinguishable. The second experimenter, in contrast, uses only the 
ten largest German cities, thus composing only 45 comparisons. Among 
them, the proportion (though not the absolute number) of discriminatory 
cases will be much !arger, and the level of accuracy reached by users of 
the recognition heuristic and the fluency heuristic, respectively, will be 
markedly different. 
This thought experiment suggests that the sampling procedure from the 
reference dass is not the only thing that matters for the results obtained. 
The size of the reference dass may also have drastic implications for, for 
instance, the observed accuracy level of heuristics and the likelihood with 
which an experimenter is able to distinguish among users of different 
heuristics. 
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DISCUSSION 
We have discussed several conceptual and methodological implications 
of different sampling procedures in psychological experiments. In the first 
section, we briefly reviewed the historical and methodological foundations 
of representative design. In the second section, we introduced three lines 
of research - on policy capturing, overconfidence, and hindsight bias - in 
which empirical evidence has been accumulated indicating that the sam-
pling procedure matters for the results obtained. Specifically, it matters 
whether the experimental stimuli are randomly sampled from a defined 
reference dass, or whether the experimenter samples the objects system-
atically, thus causing the frequency distribution and informational struc-
tures in the sample and the population to diverge. After having shown 
that the how of sampling experimental stimuli matters, in the third section 
we turned to an issue that has rarely been addressed in the literature on 
representative design: Apart from the sampling procedure, the size of the 
reference dass from which stimuli are sampled also matters for the results 
obtained. Clearly, both parties in an experiment - the participants and ex-
perimenters - cannot help but to settle on a reference dass. The question 
is whether they will settle on the same one. We conclude with a discussion 
of the issues raised. 
Selection of the Reference Class: A Time-Honored 
and Ubiquitous Problem 
The problem of choosing the adequate reference dass is neither trivial nor 
is it new. lt is, for instance, fundamental to the frequentistic interpretation 
of probabilities (for the historical routes and interpretations of probabili-
ties, see Gigerenzer et al., 1989). Conceptualizing probabilities in terms of 
relative frequencies requires specifying the reference dass within which 
we count the objects or the events in question. Logic demands that the 
specification of the reference dass precedes the counting of designated ob-
jects within it. Or, in the words of the great probability theorist Richard 
von Mises (1957), "We shall not speak of probability until a collective has 
been defined" (p. 18). 
Take, for illustration, the problem of calculating the probability of aper-
son dying within, say, the next ten years. Insurance companies need to 
estimate such probabilities to calculate a person's premium. But which of 
the person' s innumerable properties - age, sex, profession, health, income, 
eating habits, family life, to name only a few-should be used to construct 
a reference population? Each of these and many other properties (as well 
as combinations thereof) could be used to define the reference dass, andin 
all likelihood, many of the resulting reference classes would yield different 
statistics and thus different estimations for mortality risks, leaving open 
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the question of which is the correct one (von Mises, 1957; for an exam-
ple of different types of reference dasses for probabilities, see Gigerenzer 
et al., 2005). To the best of our knowledge, neither probability theorists 
nor insurance companies have yet been able to provide a solution to this 
problem. 
Selection of the Reference Class in Psychological 
Theory and Experimental Practice 
The theory of probabilistic mental models predicts that representative sam-
pling of experimental stimuli from a specified reference dass results in well-
calibrated confidence judgments (Gigerenzer et al., 1991). In this chapter, 
we have shown that this prediction may overlook an important additional 
condition for good calibration. Specifically, we have illustrated that cue 
validities can vary markedly as a function of the indusiveness of the refer-
ence dass. To the extent that confidence judgments rest on cue validities, 
they are only well calibrated when participants are sensitive to the in-
clusiveness of the reference dass. Arguably, this is not a very plausible 
expectation. Thus, for overconfidence to be eliminated in psychological 
experiments, two conditions need tobe met: (1) representative sampling 
and (2) representative sampling from the reference dass from which peo-
ple' s knowledge of cues and cue validities stem. Therein, of course, lurks 
the problem: Which reference dass is chosen, and what is its size? More-
over, how can the experimenter know the "right" reference dass and its 
size? 
Frankly, we do not have answers to these questions. Yet, let us suggest 
some directions in which one may search for answers. First and foremost, 
let us stress that we do not believe that the problem of the reference dass 
is unique to the theory of probabilistic mental models. Rather, the prob lern 
of the "right" reference dass permeates all of psychology. In principle, any 
psychological theory has to provide an answer as to which reference dass 
of objects, stimuli, and situations it is meant to apply. For instance, any 
theory of dassification and object perception ought tobe explicit about the 
reference dass of objects and properties in the world and in people' s minds 
to which it applies. In reality, to the best of our knowledge, hardly any 
psychological theory tackles the reference dass issue. Perhaps, the reason is 
that there seems tobe no good answer- for purely logical reasons. For each 
reference dass in relation to which a sampling process is representative, 
there exists a superordinate or a subordinate reference dass relative to 
which the outcome of the sampling process is simply biased. For instance, 
sampling representatively from the 83 largest German cities results in a 
sample that is unrepresentative with respect to the 500 largest German 
cities or to the 10 largest German cities. 
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Does this mean that representative design is a chimera - a creature that 
exists in the fantasy of some experimenters, but for all practical purposes is 
nonviable? We do not think so. We believe that there are possible pragmatic 
routes toward a "good enough solution." Under some circumstances, ex-
perimenters may circumvent the problems that result from fuzzy reference 
classes either by selecting one that is small, finite, and complete (e.g., all 
African states) or by creating microworlds (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2002) over 
which experimenters have full control. They thus can determine partici-
pants' exposure to these worlds and make sure tl1at the intended reference 
dass and the participants' reference dass converge. 
Another route to determining the size of the reference dass is to ex-
plore its boundaries empirically, for instance, by analyzing environmental 
frequencies. Anderson & Schooler (1991) examined a number of environ-
mental sources (e.g., the New York Times and electronic mail) to show that 
the probability that a memory for a particular piece of information will be 
needed shows reliable relationships to frequency, recency, and patterns of 
prior exposure. Such an analysis of environmental statistics could also be 
conducted in the context of overconfidence research. For the German city 
task, for instance, it may show that people are much more likely to en-
counter larger cities, such as Frankfurt and Stuttgart (ranked 5 and 8), than 
smaller cities, such as Leinefeld and Zeulenroda (ranked 345 and 403). To the 
extent that environmental frequencies are also indicative of how often an 
object is the subject of an inference, we suggest that decision makers rarely 
need to make comparisons among items drawn from the lower tail of a 
criterion distribution. 
In the context of social cognition, an empirical approach to determining 
the "right" size of social reference classes may capitalize on empirical stud-
ies indicating that the size of people's "sympathy" group is in the order of 
10-15 people (i.e., number of friends and relatives whom they contact at 
least once a month), that the typical size of the network of acquaintances is 
around 135-150, and that the number of people whose faces one can attach 
names to is around 1,500-2,000 (see Dunbar, 1996; Hill & Dunbar, 2003). 
On the basis of these and similar quantities, researchers investigating social 
cognition infer plausible estimates of the size of people's social reference 
classes. 
Yet another way to determine the "right" size of people's reference 
classes is to transfer the task of sampling experimental stimuli from 
the experimenter to the participants. In his aforementioned investigation 
of size constancy, Brunswik (1944) took exactly this approach (see also 
Hogarth, 2005, this volume). Specifically, he randomly interrupted the per-
ceiver in her flow of daily activities at randomly chosen intervals, thereby 
letting the perceiver, the environment, and chance determine which envi-
ronmental stimuli are designated to become experimental ones. 
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EPILOGUE 
Participants in psychological experiments typically respond to stimuli se-
lected by the experimenter. Each of these stimuli in and of itself constitutes 
reality. However, is this slice of reality in the experiment a sample of the 
reality to which generalization :s intended? According to Brunwik, the an-
swer is often "no." Owing to psychologists' high esteem of internal validity, 
experimental studies, according to Brunswik, often end up investigating 
phenomena at the fringe of reality. To remedy this situation, he advocated 
an entirely different approach to the sampling of stimuli: an approach in 
which experimenters apply the same standards to the sampling of stimuli 
that they espouse when they sample participants. We believe Brunswik' s 
criticism of experimental practices and his proposal for reform are as timely 
today as they were back then. Although Brunswik's representative design 
is by no means convenient, nor without its own problems, it provides us 
with a valuable if preliminary framework to conceptualize stimulus sam-
pling in experiments. Clearly, as experimenters we cannot help but sample 
stimuli, and it is up to us to strive for even better ways of doing so. 
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